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Abstract
Standard general equilibrium theory excludes starvation by assuming that every­
body can survive without trade. Because trade cannot harm consumers, they 
can therefore also survive with trade. Here this assumption is abandoned, and 
equilibria in which not everybody survives are investigated. A simple example is 
discussed, along with possible policies which might reduce starvation. Thereafter, 
for economies with a continuum of agents, the usual results are established — 
existence, the two fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics, and core 
equivalence. Their validity depends on some special but not very stringent as­
sumptions needed to deal with natural non-convexities in each consumer’s feasible 
set.
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It is unquestionably true, that in no country of the globe have the gov­
ernment, the distribution of property, and the habits of the people, been 
such as to call forth, in the most effective manner, the resources of the 
soil. Consequently, if the most advantageous possible change in all these 
respects could be supposed at once to take place, it is certain that the 
demand for labour, and the encouragement to production, might be such 
as for a short time, in some countries, and for rather a longer time in 
others, to lessen the operation of the checks to population which have 
been described.
—  M a l t h u s  (1830, p p . 247-248 o f  A. F l e w  ( e d . ) )
1. Introduction
Students of economics are routinely taught the efficiency of free markets. 
Mathematical economists, following Arrow (1951), Debreu (1954, 1959), Arrow 
and Debreu (1954), McKenzie (1954, 1959, 1961) and others, have provided rig­
orous foundations to these teachings by proving the existence of Walrasian or 
“competitive” equilibrium, as well as the two fundamental efficiency theorems of 
welfare economics which relate Pareto efficient allocations to Walrasian equilibria. 
As Sen (1977, 1981a, 1981b) has pointed out, however, the standard theorems deal 
with the issue of survival by assuming that all agents can always survive without 
trade. This we call the “survival assumption.” Since trading opportunities can­
not then detract from what is possible without trade, all agents can survive with 
trade too. Thus, according to the standard theory, in any Walrasian equilibrium 
there is universal survival. Yet the survival assumption is clearly counter to the 
facts of life and death in almost all the worlds’ economies, whatever their stage 
of development or their economic system. Only a very few peasant societies are 
truly self-sufficient. Even in those which are, few individual consumers are likely 
to be able to survive for long on their own.
In fact it is all too evident that, even in wealthy countries, some people do die 




























































































or because they cannot afford to keep warm during bitter winter weather. So the 
world does not fit this standard model of Walrasian equilibrium. It is of some 
importance, however, to know whether this is due to the equally evident failure 
of economies to conform to the Walrasian market model because of monopolies, 
externalities, taxes, or other “market failures.” Or alternatively, whether it is 
the survival assumption itself that needs to be questioned. For if the personal 
tragedies of starvation or disease are the result of market failures and/or govern­
ment intervention in markets, there is that much better a case for laissez faire 
economic policies (including the promotion of competition and remedies for the 
most serious external diseconomies). On the other hand, if such personal tragedies 
are in part the result of market forces when the people are unable to survive with­
out, for instance, being able to trade their labour power or skills, then laissez faire 
becomes much less acceptable.
For this reason it seems important to know whether the survival assumption 
really does play a crucial role in the standard Walrasian theory of competitive 
markets. This requires a theory of how competitive markets can work in the 
absence of the survival assumption. One of our aims, therefore, will be to see 
what it takes to assure survival — either free markets on their own, or else some 
redistributive policies such as welfare programs or land reform.
Among past writers, Malthus (1798, 1830) certainly described features of 
economies in which the growth of population was limited only by drastic scarcity. 
He also realized that the distribution of wealth was an important influence on 
the numbers of survivors from one generation to the next. Other references to 
discussions of starvation by classical economists can be found in Sen (1986). Yet, 
as far as the modern literature on Walrasian economics is concerned, we have found 
only the papers by Bergstrom (1971), Moore (1975) and McKenzie (1981) which 
really consider the implications of abandoning the standard survival assumption, 
and they do so only to discuss conditions that suffice to ensure the existence of 




























































































has yet considered formal general models of Walrasian equilibrium in which some 
individuals do not survive. Koopmans (1957, p. 62), however, did at least pose the 
question, noting that . there is considerable challenge to further research on the 
survival problem . . . , ” and going on to suggest, moreover, that “One ‘hard-boiled’ 
alternative would be to assume instantaneous elimination by starvation of those 
whose resources prove insufficient for survival, and to look for conditions ensuring 
existence of an ‘equilibrium’ involving survival of some consumers.” This is the key 
idea that appears not to have been followed up at all thoroughly or systematically 
as yet, and which will be explored in this paper.
One reason for economists’ failure to tackle this problem may be the general 
belief that standard general equilibrium theory somehow breaks down or does 
not apply when survival of all agents is not guaranteed. Indeed, in an otherwise 
illuminating presentation of some examples of entitlement failure, Desai (1989, 
p. 430) first points out that, “If there is no market failure, then relative price 
movements should lead to optimal outcomes,” which is quite correct if we interpret 
“optimal” to mean just “Pareto efficient.” He then goes on, however, to state and 
even emphasize that, “while an equilibrium exists, relative prices fail to play an 
allocative role.” It is true that he does not discuss Pareto efficiency directly. 
Yet these sentences suggest to us a belief that entitlement failures, while not 
preventing existence of (competitive) equilibrium, nevertheless do cause the price 
mechanism to break down in a way which leads to (Pareto) suboptimal or inefficient 
outcomes. Now, unless entitlement failures are themselves regarded as a form of 
market failure, this would clearly contradict the most robust result in general 
equilibrium theory — namely, the first efficiency theorem of welfare economics 
stating that whenever Walrasian equilibrium allocations exist, they must be Pareto 
efficient. Yet we shall show that entitlement failures do nothing to create any 
Pareto inefficiencies, and so cannot possibly be market failures in any normal sense. 
Another purpose of this paper, therefore, is to correct the apparently common 
misconception that, because some individuals are starving to death, the usual 




























































































So we will reconsider the theory of Walrasian economic equilibrium without 
imposing the usual survival assumption. Indeed we will consider when and in 
what sense equilibrium allocations can occur without survival of all individuals. 
The more technical later sections show that the standard theorems concerning 
existence and Pareto efficiency of Walrasian equilibrium are still valid, with some 
modifications. The most major of these arises from the simple observation that 
the number of surviving people is a discrete variable, so that there are inherent 
non-convexities, whereas standard Walrasian theory assumes convexity. Yet the 
proportion of survivors in a large population is, to a very good approximation, a 
continuous variable. Thus we choose to work with a continuum of agents in the 
way that Aumann (1964, 1966) pioneered. And we shall also prove a version of 
the core equivalence theorem for such continuum economies.
For existence proofs in particular, it will also be necessary in general to assume 
that the distribution of “needs” — of what individuals need in order to be on the 
margin of survival — is dispersed or, technically, is a non-atomic measure. Then 
mean demand per individual will be continuous and so existence will be assured 
under the other usual assumptions.
The formal part of the paper begins in Section 2 with an extended discussion 
of a particular example. This incorporates a Leontief technology for using land 
and labour in order to produce a single consumption good. Labour is supplied 
inelastically by those who survive. Conditions on exogenous parameter values 
which permit survival axe derived. It is shown how the proportion of survivors is 
determined under a laissez faire Walrasian equilibrium when these conditions are 
not met and when inequality causes some people to starve. Remedial policy is also 
considered. We show that either lump-sum or land redistribution, or a poll subsidy 
financed by income taxes, can ensure survival whenever it is physically feasible. 
Food subsidies, however, are no help at all even in increasing the proportion of 
survivors.




























































































issue by adding survival as a good in its own right and then specifying each agent’s 
consumption set as the union of a “survival” set with a disjoint “non-survival” set. 
Section 3 considers a general continuum economy in which each agent’s consump­
tion set C is such a union, which is non-convex, of course. Accordingly we use 
methods for dealing with such non-convex consumption sets such as those devel­
oped by, amongst others, Hildenbrand (1968, 1969), Mas-Colell (1977), Yamazaki 
(1978a, 1981), Coles (1986), Funaki and Kaneko (19S6). Thus, Section 3 shows 
that most of the standard theorems of general equilibrium analysis do still hold 
— notably, existence of equilibrium, the two fundamental efficiency theorems of 
welfare economics, and core equivalence.
Finally, Section 4 contains conclusions and discusses some important reserva­
tions.
2. An Example
2.1. Description of the Economy
The economy is assumed to consist of a large number (in fact, a continuum) 
of small farmers who each produce the same crop using identical technologies. 
Fanners also have identical tastes and consumption sets; only their endowments 
of land differ.
Each farmer has preferences defined over the three-dimensional consumption 
set
C := { ( - t , - h , c )  | t >  0, 0 <  h < (, c >  c } .  (1)
Here t denotes the (exogenous) amount of land which the farmer has available to 
supply or use in production, c denotes consumption of the crop, h denotes labour 
supply, and c, i  are two positive constants representing the minimum subsistence 
food consumption and the maximum possible supply of labour respectively.
The constant returns to scale Leontief technology to which each farmer has 
access requires A units of labour and r units of land in order to produce each 




























































































which is defined for all t >  0. The mean holding of land is denoted by t, and the 
proportion of farmers who own no land by /0 :=  -F(O). Assume that t >  t  c and 
i  >  A c, so there is more land and each person has more labour than the minimum 
needed to produce subsistence for everyone.
It will be assumed that farmers care only for consumption. Perhaps leisure is 
a luxury good that poor farmers cannot afford. Contingent upon survival (c >  c), 
each farmer prefers allocations with more consumption to less, and supplies the 
maximum amount of labour (h =  () in order to have as much food as possible, 
whether it is produced directly or else purchased out of wage income.
There are assumed to be perfectly competitive markets for output (corn), 
labour and land, with corresponding prices denoted by p, w and r respectively. As 
usual. Walrasian equilibrium requires utility maximization, profit maximization, 
and market clearing. It is clear from the usual no-pure-profit condition that in 
any Walrasian equilibrium with positive production the price system must satisfy 
p =  w A +  r t . Thus p > w A > 0 and p =  \w  when r =  0. For later reference, we 
note that the rental-price ratio r/p 6 [0, 1 /r ]  is determined by the equation
r/p =  I1 -  (w /p )X]/t  (2)
for each wage-price ratio w/p in the closed interval of possible values [0, 1 /A].
Because production takes place under constant returns to scale, it is also 
true that in Walrasian equilibrium each farmer is completely indifferent to the 
allocation of his land and labour between different farming enterprises, including 
any that he himself may own. Each farmer is also indifferent to how much land 




























































































2.2. Equilibrium with Survival
Consumption demand by a farmer who has t units of land must satisfy the 
budget equation p c =  w£ +  rt. Equilibrium with positive wages therefore requires 
that mean consumption per head c must satisfy pc  =  w i  +  r t  and also t  — X c, 
t >  t  c.
When t >  t  C/X there is more land than can possibly be cultivated even if the 
farmers use all the available labour, so land must be a free good in any equilibrium. 
This implies that r =  0 and p — Xw. The distribution of land holdings is then 
irrelevant. There is in fact an obvious equilibrium in which every farmer consumes 
c =  i/X > c and supplies t  units of labour.
When t =  r f /A  there is just enough labour to farm all the land, and then 
any wage-price ratio w/p in the interval [c/f, 1/A] is a potential equilibrium. By
(2) it follows that r/p lies in the interval [0,(£ — X)cJ t f]. One has c =  f/A  =  t/r 
and also p c =  w t +  r i~ > w C > p c . Thus all markets clear and all agents survive, 
supplying l  units of labour. Of course, this case is non-generic and so we shall not 
have much to say about it in the rest of the paper.
2.3. Non-Survival
Another and for us a much more interesting possibility occurs when there 
is surplus labour and the per capita land endowment is therefore small, with 
t < t  (./X. Then no Walrasian equilibrium exists in the usual sense if there are 
some farmers who own no land. This is because the only possible equilibrium wage 
is zero, and then the landless cannot alford subsistence consumption.
To avoid this non-existence problem, we now modify both the example and 
our concept of equilibrium. Let us add to the commodity space a fourth dimension 
with an indicator variable i £ { —1 , 0 } representing either survival, if i =  0, or 
non-survival, in case i =  —1. The number —1 can be thought of as signifying 
that the agent has to give up his life in order to achieve any feasible plan of net 




























































































new four-dimensional survival set
S :=  { ( —t, —h, c, i) | t >  0, 0 <  h < £, c >  c, 1 =  0 } . (3)
But we also append to the set S another non-survival set defined as
N  :=  { (—t, — h, c, i) | t > 0, /( =  0, c > 0, i =  — 1 }. (4)
The consumption set then becomes the union C =  5  U N  of the extended survival 
set S in (3) above with this additional non-survival set N . This is depicted in 
Figure 1, which shows the projection of the two sets 5  and N onto the three- 








Allocations in which the farmer supplies no labour (h =  0) but consumes less 
than the subsistence level (0 < c < c) are now assumed to be feasible provided 



























































































farmer’s labour dies with him, as he is too weak or malnourished to be able to 
add his labour to the pool of surplus labour. Thus his consumption is limited 
to the proceeds from selling any land endowment. Of course, if a farmer’s land 
endowment is large enough relative to existing prices, he may attain subsistence 
consumption and sell his labour endowment at the going wage, thereby attaining 
survival in S.
Assume that survival of any sort is preferred to non-survival. Also, whereas 
Green (1976, pp. 32 and 36), for instance, postulates that there is no preference 
ordering over points at which the consumer does not survive, we assume that the 
preference ordering does extend to points of N. Indeed, we assume that whether 
the farmer survives or not, more food is always preferred to less food.
Consider now the difficult case where some farmers are landless and also 
t < t t j A so that there is surplus labour. Then there is no equilibrium in which 
every farmer can attain the survival portion of the consumption set. Incorporate 
into the model the augmented consumption set C — S U N defined above. Also, 
allow the possibility of compensated equilibrium (in the sense of Arrow and Hahn. 
1971), in which fanners at a minimum expenditure point in the survival section 5 
of the consumption set C may be arbitrarily restricted to an allocation in the non- 
survival portion .V of the consumption set that costs the same. In compensated 
equilibrium utility is maximized by all agents except some of those at the minimum 
expenditure level needed to attain the survival portion of the consumption set. 
These agents on the margin of survival minimize expenditure subject to reaching 
a given indifference curve, but they may or may not maximize utility. Indeed, those 
whose utility is not maximized may not even survive, and moreover the survivors 
among those on the margin are arbitrarily chosen according to the requirements 
of market equilibrium. It should be noted that Dasgupta and Ray (19S6-7) use a 
similar concept of equilibrium in their efficiency wage explanation of involuntary 
unemployment. Also, observe how admitting compensated equilibrium in this 




























































































demand correspondence. Then a continuum of agents will guarantee that mean 
excess demand is convex-valued (see Section 3).
An important feature of this kind of equilibrium is that agents who have 
some land but do not survive are still allowed to trade in order to maximize 
their consumption of food. Unlike labour, land does not perish with its owner. 
Rather, non-survivors sell all their land and use the proceeds to consume what they 
can afford before they succumb. We are not sure that this faithfully represents 
Koopmans’ (1957, p. 62) “instant elimination” of non-survivors. But it seems more 
realistic than imposing zero consumption on all non-survivors. It is, moreover, a 
crucial feature permitting existence and efficiency of equilibrium. For if agents who 
did not survive were unable to consume, the set C N defined in (4) would consist 
only of the half-line through the origin with t > 0. Then agents’ preferences would 
be locally satiated, since all points of this half-line are equally abhorrent.
Given that there is now no equilibrium with all farmers surviving, we consider 
three cases.
CASE 2A. £t — fo) <  Xt < ( t and all those with any land survive.
In this case there will turn out to be a compensated equilibrium at a sub­
sistence real wage of w/p =  c/£, which is just enough to enable the survival of a 
landless person who works £ hours. Each landless farmer is a marginal survivor in 
this compensated Walrasian equilibrium. By (2), the rental-price ratio is therefore 
given by r/p =  (£ — X c)/£ r. A proportion / „  <  /0 of the population will be un­
able to survive, however, because they remain involuntarily unemployed; for these 
c =  0 and h =  0. All who starve are landless. Yet among the landless farmers, 
a proportion fo — / „  of the total population do manage to survive at the least 
cost point of the survival portion S of their consumption set; for these c =  c and 
h =  £. Of course, all farmers with positive land endowment survive; for these one 
has h =  £ and c =  c +  (£ — X c) t/t £. Note how clearing of all markets requires that




























































































Both these equations are satisfied when the proportion of survivors is 1 — f n, 
where / „  :=  1 — (A t/ tr). So the allocation which we have described must be a 
compensated equilibrium.
Note finally that 0 <  / „  < /o precisely when the inequalities defining this 
case are both satisfied.
Case 2B. I t [ I - F ( tc )] < A t <  I t (1 — f 0) and not a 11 fanners with land survive.
Here there will be a compensated equilibrium with the minimum amount of 
land needed for survival being given by some number s in the range 0 < s < r c. 
Since p c  =  w l  +  rs  and, in addition, (2) must still be true, the corresponding 
equilibrium wage-price and rental-price ratios must be
w
P
T Ç  — S  




C — A r
T t — As ( C )
Farmers whose land holdings t exceed the critical value s survive with h =  i  and 
c =  (w i  4- r t)/p >  c. But those with t <  s could not afford to consume c even if 
they could somehow supply f  units of labour; they are therefore unable either to 
survive or to work, and so find themselves with h =  0 and c =  r t/ p < r s / p < c .
Finally, according to the requirements of market clearing, some of the farmers 
with land endowment exactly equal to .« survive, while others do not. Indeed, the 
proportion q of non-survivors in the total population is determined so that the 
labour market clearing condition Ac =  €(1 — </) is satisfied. Actually, since the 
land market must clear as well, one must also have t =  r  c and so Xt/r =  ((1  — q). 
This determines a unique value of q which, in the case being considered, must lie 
in the interval /o  < q < F (tc). The corresponding value of s must then be given 
by
s =  inf{<  | 1 — F (t) <  Xt/Cr] =  sup { t | 1 — F (t) > Xt/C r  }. (7)
This is the unique value of s which ensures that F (t) > q whenever t > s and 
that F (t) < q whenever t <  s. If there is a negligible set of farmers whose 




























































































In this latter case the compensated equilibrium found here becomes a Walrasian 
equilibrium, since only agents in a negligible set are failing to maximize their 
preferences. Generally, however, there is only a compensated equilibrium, in which 
some farmers whose landholding is s survive, while others do not.
CASE 2C. \t <  t t [1 — F (tc)] and only the self-sufficient survive.
In this final case there is so much labour and so little land that the only 
possible Walrasian equilibrium prices satisfy w/p =  0 and r/p =  1 /r. At these 
prices all agents with t <  t c do not survive, since they can only afford to have h =  0 
and to sell all their land in order to consume at c =  f / r  < c. But every farmer who 
has t > t c and so has enough land to produce subsistence consumption using his 
own labour does survive by choosing h =  (  and c =  t/r >  c. Mean consumption 
per head then satisfies c =  t/r, while mean labour supply per head is given by 
t  [1 — F {r  c)] >  Ac. So markets clear with labour as a free good, and there is a 
Walrasian equilibrium at these prices.
2.4. Remedial Policy
Despite the potential for non-survival when t < t (/ A, note that a program of 
land redistribution can always be used to ensure that everybody survives, because 
of the assumption that t >  r  c and f  > Ac. For if land is redistributed so that all 
farmers have access to the same amount t, then each farmer is obviously able to 
attain survival through production using only his own land and labour.
Moreover, a balanced-budget tax-transfer system can achieve the same effect. 
To see this, suppose that all rental income from land is taxed at the flat rate 0, 
with the resulting tax revenues being redistributed equally to all agents by means 
of a poll subsidy or uniform lump-sum transfer m. Real transfers of m/p =  c and a 
tax rate o f 8 =  T c jt  < 1 will then give rise to an equilibrium with an excess supply 
of labour (since i >  \i/r) and so with prices given by w/p =  0 and r/p =  1 /r .  
Each farmer’s budget constraint takes the form c < c +  [(1 /r) — (c/t)\t. Because 




























































































and so every farmer can certainly afford to survive even though there is no wage 
income. The government’s budget balances with m =  6rt.
Such a tax-transfer scheme is also equivalent to a system under which the 
government uses the proceeds from a rental income tax at rate 0 =  r c jt in order 
to purchase c units of food per head on the open market and then distribute 
this amount equally to all farmers. This system is not a food subsidy, of course, 
but distribution in kind. Notice that wage income is always zero in each of these 
equilibria, so there is no scope for redistribution financed by a tax on wage income.
In contrast, no system of food subsidies, financed either by a tax on landlords 
or by an income tax, can reduce the extent of starvation or even alter the allocation 
in any way. For let (p£, we, r ‘ ) denote the (compensated) equilibrium prices in the 
absense of any taxes or subsidies. Let 7  be the ad valorem rate of subsidy on food 
purchases and let u>, p denote the ad valorem rates of tax on wage income and 
on land rents respectively. The budget constraint for a farmer with landholding t 
then becomes
p ( l  -  y )c  < u i(l -  u/)( +  r (1 -  p)t. . (S)
We will show that when such taxes and subsidies are introduced, there is a new 
equilibrium in which the government balances its budget and producer prices 
(p ,w ,r) adjust so that prices to consumers are still given by
Pe = P (1  - 7 ) ;  u>e =  w (1 — w); r '  =  r (1 — p) (9)
exactly as before. Then, since consumer prices are entirely unchanged, so is the 
demand side of the economy and the entire equilibrium allocation of consumption, 
work, land, and survival opportunities to all consumers. Indeed, to show that 
there is a new equilibrium as described, it suffices to check that producers are still 
maximizing profits at the new producer prices (p, w, r). Yet, since both consumers 
and the government are all balancing their budgets in any new equilibrium, one 
must have pe c =  wf h -f r' / or





























































































p -fc  =  wu)h +  rp t. (11)
But then adding (10) and (11) gives
p c =  wh  +  r t =  w Ac +  r r  c =  (w A +  r t ) c (12)
where the second equality holds because clearing of the labour and land markets 
implies that h =  Ac and i  =  r c. Since c must be positive in the original equi­
librium, the no pure profit condition p =  w\ +  r r  is a direct implication of ( 12 ). 
(The fact that the no pure profit condition is satisfied by both the new producer 
prices and consumer prices is reminiscent of the result presented by Diamond and 
Mirrlees, 1976).
So there is indeed an equilibrium with taxes in which neither consumer prices 
nor quantities change. In particular, the food subsidy does nothing at all to lower 
the price of food faced by consumers or to help the starving. Instead the subsidy 
is entirely passed on to the producers and then all taxed away in order to finance 
the food subsidies.
3. General Equilibrium Analysis
3.1. Agents’ Feasible Sets
Sen (1977, 1981a, b) chose to use an “exchange entitlements” approach to 
analyse the question of whether individuals could afford to survive. This certainly 
has a powerful intuitive appeal. Yet, as Srinivasan (1983) has observed, it is not 
strictly necessary, and essentially the same idea can also be captured, at least for 
the results to presented below, by the usual kind of budget set within a finite 
dimensional commodity space 3fG. The issue of whether an individual survives 
depends on whether this budget set intersects the set of net trade vectors which 
that individual needs in order to survive. If it does, then the individual will be 
able to survive by a judicious choice of consumption and production plans. But if 




























































































So we consider an economy in which all agents are consumer/workers who 
may or may not own land and other primary resources. The typical agent has a 
survival consumption set C s , together with a non-survival consumption set C A . 
Each vector c 6 C s U C N is a net consumption vector which may have negative 
components corresponding to the kinds of labour which the agent supplies. The 
two sets C s  and C N are both assumed to be closed convex subsets of 3fc  that 





Figure 2 shows the consumption set of Figure 1 after it has been projected 
onto the space SR2 of consumption/leisure pairs. As Figure 2 indicates, the two 
sets Cs  and C N may intersect. Then, if c € Cs D C N, the agent has the choice 
between surviving and not. Of course, it is presumed that the agent always chooses 




























































































and the agent starves. It is also presumed that 0 6 C s  U C N, so that no trade 
is always feasible at least for an agent who does not survive. Usually, of course,
0 6 C N \ C s , because few agents are entirely self-sufficient.
It now seems natural to have preferences for the consumer defined over the 
set C s  U C N, and to assume that any point in C s  is preferred to any point in 
C N, though within C N more food is always preferred to less. This approach, 
however, leads to certain difficulties which are illustrated in Figure 2 above, where 
possible indifference curves are displayed. Notice that (—t,0 ,c) is strictly preferred 
to ( —f, — £, 0). Yet the lower contour set of points which are weakly worse than 
( —t, 0) is not closed, since it includes points of the form ( —f, 0, c—e) for all small 
positive e, but not the limit point ( —f, 0, c).1 Thus, not only is the consumption 
set non-convex, but also preferences are typically discontinuous at (—f ,0,c).
To avoid such discontinuities we shall make use of a simple trick. This involves 
treating survival as an extra good in its own right, labelled as good 0. So we 
add to the commodity space 5RG an extra dimension with an indicator variable
1 e { —1,0  } representing either survival, if i =  0, or non-survival, in case i =  — 1 . 
The extra good can be thought of as life itself, which has to be given up in case the 
individual does not survive. The price of this extra good will always be zero. The 
two values -1 and 0 have been chosen so that: (i) preferences can still be monotone 
in the extended space SRG+1, with life preferred to death; (ii) the aggregate excess 
demand for good 0 could never be positive, thus allowing equilibrium to occur 
with a non-negative demand even for good 0, whose price is always zero anyway.
This leads us to define the consumption set as the union
C :=  ({0 } x C S) U ( { - 1 } x C N) C { - 1 , 0 }  x SR6' (13)
o f  the two disjoint extended convex sets C s :=  {0} x Cs  and C N :=  { —1} x C N. 
Note that C  is not convex, and even incorporates survival as an indivisible good.
1 In fact earlier versions o f  this paper used precisely this formulation, and used particular ad 
hoc methods in order to overcome the difficulties created by the resulting discontinuities. In this 




























































































As in the example of Section 2, assume that production is undertaken by many 
small and individually owned production units. Following Rader (1964), assume 
that each agent has access to a convex production possibility set Y  C 3?G+1. It 
is assumed here that Y  includes 0, allows free disposal of all goods except 0, and 
that y 6 Y  implies j/o — 0 because only labour and not life itself can be used as 
an input to the production process. Finally, Y  is assumed to be bounded above 
because any individual agent can only control bounded quantities of inputs and 
these produce bounded outputs.
To survive, the agent requires a net trade vector in the survival set
X s  :=  C s  -  Y  =  { x e » G+1 I 3c e  C"9; 3y e  Y  : x =  c — y }. (14)
The corresponding non-survival set X  ' := C'N — Y  is also feasible for the 
agent. Notice that both X s  and X N are convex because C s , C N and Y  are all 
convex. Also, because of (13), the agent’s set of feasible net trades is
x  = x s u x N = (cs — Y)u (CN - Y) = (c,suc,v)-r
= ({0 } X C S) U ( { -1 }  X C n ) - Y  C { - 1 , 0 }  x S G
(15)
To summarize, we have so far assumed that:
(A .l ) .  Each agent lias a feasible set o f net trades taking the form X  =  C — Y, 
where the consumption set C C { - 1 ,0 }  x satisfies (13). with C S,C N C 3?G 
and the production set Y  C {0} X 5KG satisfying the conditions that: (i) both 
sets C s and C N are closed, convex, bounded below, and allow free disposal o f all 
physical commodities y 6 G; (ii) 0 € C s U C'N; (Hi) Y  is convex, bounded above, 
and allows free disposal of all goods except 0; (iv) 0 € 1 '.
These assumptions on the two sets C and Y  have implications for the set A 
which are summarized in the following:
Lemma. X  is a closed subset of the commodity space { —1 , 0 } x HG such that: (i) 




























































































by a vector x; (iv) X  is the union o f two disjoint convex sets X s C {0} x and 
X N C { — 1} x as specified in (15) above.
PROOF: Since all the other properties claimed in the Lemma are obvious, we prove 
only that X  is closed.
Indeed, suppose that x v E X  where x v — cv — y" with (c " ,y l/) E C x Y  for
v =  1 ,2 ,.. .,  and suppose that x v —> x* as is —> oo. Then, since C has a lower
bound c and Y  has an upper bound y, it follows that
c = c v =  x u +  y v = x u +  y x* +  y
and y = i/ =  cv — x u = c — x v —► c — x*
as v —* oo. Hence the sequence of pairs (c17, y1') E C'x Y  must be bounded, and so 
has a convergent subsequence with a limit (c*,y*) which, because the two sets C 
and Y  are both closed, must be a member of C x Y . But now cu — yu =  x u —> x* 
as v —> oo, which is only possible if x* =  c* — y* E C — Y =  X .
In future a typical vector 2 E { —1,0 } x will be written in the partitioned 
form z =  (z0,2G), where z0 E { - 1 ,0 }  and zG E &G.
3.2. Agents’ Preferences
Each agent is also assumed to have a (complete and transitive) preference 
ordering R on the consumption set C, and to be unconcerned about production 
except insofar as it ciffects consumption and labour supply, etc. It is assumed that 
these preferences are:
(i) monotone in the sense that c1 =  c implies c' R c and also that b b' implies 
(z',6) P (i,b') whenever b,b' E 3£G and i E { —1,0 } (where P  denotes the 
strict preference relation corresponding to R);
(ii) continuous in the sense that the upper and lower contour sets { c E C \ c R c' } 
and { c E C \ c' R c } are both closed for every c' e C.
Of course, it is assumed that consumers prefer survival, so that (z,6) P  (i\b') 
whenever 6, b' E 3£G, 2 =  0 and i1 =  — 1. In this sense, life is lexicographically prior 




























































































(A .2). There is a continuous and monotone preference ordering R defined on the 
consumption set C with the property that (0,b) P  ( — 1,6') whenever b E C s and 
b' e  C N.
The agent’s preferences R for consumption can be converted into preferences 
for net trades. For given any fixed net trade vector x E A', define
7 (2 ) :=  { c E C | 3y E Y : c =  x + y and Vy E Y  : c R (x +  y) } (16)
as the agent’s set of optimal consumption vectors. Because Y  is compact and 
the upper contour sets of the preference ordering R  are all closed, the set 7 (2 ) is 
indeed non-empty for every x E A . Moreover, if c and c' both belong to 7 (2 ) for 
any 2 E A”, then c and c' must be indifferent. So there is a well defined preference 
ordering on A' such that
2 %Zx' <=> [Vc E 7 (2 ); Vc# E 7 (2*) : c R c'\. (17)
Of course, to be an ordering, C must not only be complete as it obviously is, 
because R  is complete — but it must also be transitive. However, transitivity of 
follows readily from transitivity of R.
Notice that when the agent chooses 2 to maximize the preference ordering 
~  over A  subject to a budget constraint of the form p x  < m, this implies that 
c =  7 (2 ) maximizes R over C subject to the constraint p c  < m +  py. where y 
is any net output vector which maximizes (net) profits py  subject to y E Y. So 
preference maximization by the agent implies profit maximization.
An immediate implication of our assumptions regarding R is that the prefer­
ence ordering constructed above and the corresponding strict preference relation 
>- must satisfy the following:
LEMMA. There is a (complete and transitive) preference ordering C on the feasible 
set X  which is monotone and satisfies:




























































































(ii)  x y  x' whenever x E X s and x' E A  .
Note how it is not claimed that the lower contour set { z E A l a j ' - R a i J i s  
closed for all x' E X . Indeed, this is generally not true.
The typical agent is therefore characterized by the non-convex but closed 
consumption set C, the closed production set T , and the continuous preference 
ordering R  on C. Thus, the space 0  of agents’ characteristics will consist of triples 
(C, Y, R) satisfying (A .l) and (A .2), and this will be given the closed convergence 
topology for continuous preferences that is described in Hildenbrand (1974, p. 96). 
Note that, because the corresponding preference ordering for net trade vectors 
is not continuous in general, the closed convergence topology cannot be applied 
to the space consisting only of pairs (A', fc). Write 5 (0 )  for the family of Borel 
measurable sets in 0  with its topology of closed convergence.
3.3. A Continuum Economy
Following Aumann (1964, 1966) and Hildenbrand (1974), assume that there 
is a non-atomic measure space of agents (A,.4,cv). Then a continuum economy 
is a mapping E : A —> 0  which is measurable with respect to the two <7-algebras 
A  and 5 (0 )  — i.e., E ~ l(H ) E A  for every measurable set H E 5 (0 ) .  For every 
cl E A, write a’s characteristic E(a) as (A a, ~ ft). Because each such characteristic 
must satisfy (A .l), in particular there exists a lower bound x_a to X a. Assume:
(A .3). The vector function x_: A —» is measurable and the integral f  x_ over
A is finite.
An allocation of net trade vectors in the economy E is a measurable mapping 
/  : A —> 5RG+1 such that f{a )  e  X a a.e. and f  f  =  0.
Define the modified price simplex
A : = { p e » G+1 |po =  0;ps > 0 ( fl =  l , 2 ....... G) and £ ^ ^  =  1 } (18)
with relative interior




























































































As explained above, the price of life is taken to be zero — the right to live cannot be 
bought or sold, even though some agents may not be able to afford the commodities 
they need in order to ensure their own survival.
For each agent a E A and price vector p E A, define:
(i) the budget set Ba(p) :=  { x E X a | p x  < 0 };
(ii) the demand set £a(p) :=  { x E Ba(p) \ x' y a x = >  Px> > 0  };
(iii) the compensated demand set (Arrow and Hahn, 1971)
£?(p) :=  { x  e  B„(p) I x ')zax = >  px' >  0 }
which Hildenbrand (1968) had earlier called the “expenditure minimizing” 
set;
(iv) the weak demand set (Khan and Yamazaki, 1981)
C '( p ) •= { x  £ B„(p) | x' y a x = >  p x 1 >  0 }.
Note that £a(,P) U ^a(p) C C,”  (p) always, trivially. Because of locally non- 
satiated preferences, it is easy to see that £„(p) C £„ (p) =  £^ (p) for all p >  0. In 
addition, because 0 € A’„ , so B a(p) ^  0 always. Because A'„ is bounded below, 
Ba(p) is compact whenever p G A J. Because the upper contour sets of fc are 
closed, it follows that 0 ^  f 0(p) whenever p £ A 0.
A Walrasian equilibrium ( f ,p ) is an allocation /  of net trade vectors, together 
with a price vector p G A satisfying f (a )  G f a(p) a.e. in A and J p f  =  0. Because 
p >  0 and f  f  = 0 for an allocation, it follows from this definition that, for all 
g G {0} U G, one has both /  f g < 0  and also pg — 0 whenever f  fg < 0 — the 
usual “rule of free goods.”
To show that a Walrasian equilibrium exists, it will be convenient to prove 
first the existence of a compensated equilibrium ( f ,p )  consisting of an allocation 
/  and a price vector p G A such that f(a )  G £f(p ) a.e. in A and J p f  =  0 (Arrow 





























































































An allocation /  is Pareto efficient if there is no other (feasible) allocation / '  
such that / '(a )  Va f ( a ) a.e. hi .4. An allocation /  is in the core if there is no 
blocking coalition K  with an alternative allocation / '  : K  —> 3iG+1 such that
(i) / ' ( « )  Va / (a )  a.e. in K ; (ii) [  f  $  0; (in) a (K ) >  0. (20)
J K
The following two results are standard because (A.l)  and (A .2) together guar­
antee that consumers have locally non-satiated preferences:
(1) F irst Efficiency T heorem. If ( f ,p )  is a Walrasian equilibrium, then the 
allocation f  is Pareto efficient.
(2) FIRST Core T heorem. I f ( f ,p )  is a Walrasian equilibrium, then f  is in the 
core.
Because of the Walrasian equilibria without survival which were exhibited in 
Sections 2 and 3, these trivial results already establish that Pareto efficiency by no 
means guarantees survival of all agents. Nor can non-survivors necessarily block 
an allocation in order to bring about their own survival.
It is much less trivial to prove the other three promised results, namely:
(3) existence of a Walrasian equilibrium;
(4) the second efficiency theorem — i.e., any Pareto efficient allocation is Wal­
rasian after suitable lump-sum taxes and transfers have been made;
(5) core equivalence — i.e., not only is every Walrasian allocation in the core, as 
in (2), but also every core allocation is Walrasian for some price vector.
Indeed Section 5.7 below introduces extra assumptions in order to ensure that a 
compensated equilibrium is actually a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, because 
of our insistence that po =  0 — that life should be a free good — not even standard 





























































































3.4. Continuity of Compensated Demand
A proof of existence of compensated equilibrium in somewhat different econ­
omies with non-convex consumption sets has been provided by Khan and Yamazaki 
(1981, Proof of Proposition 2, pp. 223-4). Note, however, how they actually prove 
existence of “weakly competitive allocations,” which are not the same because 
they do not assume local non-satiation of preferences. Also, they do not normalize 
agents’ endowments to zero as we would do in a pure exchange economy. Their 
proof in turn relies heavily on the work of Hildenbrand (1974) as amplified by 
Debreu (1982).
A key part of the existence proof relies on the continuity result below, which is 
of some general interest that goes beyond the specific model being considered here. 
The Lemma concerns the continuity properties of the typical agent’s profit function 
x(Y ,p), and of the net output, compensated consumption demand, and compen­
sated net trade demand correspondences r/(Y,p), (,(C. R.p, m ). and f(C ,Y , R .p) 
respectively. These are defined for every consumption set C. production set Y, 
and preference ordering R which satisfy (A.l) and (A .2) of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
as well as for every price vector p £ A 0 and income level m, as follows:
Note how each agent does choose y £ ;/(} ',p), and so faces the budget constraint 
p c  <  n(Y,p), because there are no direct preferences over production.
Lemma . Under assumptions (A .l) and (A .2) as stated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 
above, the profit function v(Y,p) is continuous when the space 0  x A is given 
its product topology, and the three correspondences ij(Y,p), t((C ,R ,p,m ) and 
£( C, Y, R, p) all have closed graphs relative to the appropriate spaces 0  x A  x JRG+1
7r(Y,p) := argmax 
V(y,P) ■= max
( 21 )
C(C, R,p, m) :=  { c £ C \ p c < m and [c' £ C, c' R c = >  pc' > rn) }; 





























































































or O X A  X ft X JRG+1 when each is given its appropriate product topology, and 
when 0  is given its topology of closed convergence.
P roof:
A: Continuity of profit and of supply.
Let (Y " ,pv, y " ) (v =  1,2, . . . )  be any infinite sequence of points in the graph 
of y(Y,p) which converges to (Y ,p ,y )  as v —> oo. Then 7r(Y ‘/,p l/) =  p" y" —» py. 
Also, because yv 6 Y "  —> Y  in the closed convergence topology, so y £ Y .
Now, for any y =  (yo-yG) € Y, consider any other y =  (y0,y G) £ 3?G+1 such 
that j/Q =  j/o =  0 and yG <C yG■ Because Y " —* Y  as v —» oo, for each large enough 
v there must exist y w =  (y^, y l/G) 6 Y v such that ifif — j/q =  0 and y uG y G. 
Since each p" > 0, it follows from profit maximization that
p" y‘¥ =  *{y'’,p'r) > p ¥yr Z p ' l - P l L
as v —> oo. Since p“ y" —> py  as v —* oo, it follows that py > py  whenever 
VQ =  Vo — 0 and yG yG■ Therefore py  >  py. Since this is true for all y 6 Y , 
and since y £ Y, it must be true that: (i) y £ i;(K,p); (ii) ir(Y,p) =  py. From 
(i) it follows directly that y(Y,p) has a closed graph. From (ii) on the other hand, 
since p" y v —* p y  as v —> oo, it follows that 7r —» %(Y ,p ). So 7r(K,p) is a 
continuous function.
B: Continuity of compensated consumption demand.
Let (C ", R " , p " , c") (i/ -  1,2, . . . )  be any infinite sequence of points in 
the graph of £(C, R ,p,m ) which converges to (C ,R ,p ,m ,c)  as v —> oo. Then 
p" c" <  m" and c" £ C" for u =  1 , 2, . . . ,  so that in the limit as v —» oo one has 
p c <  m and also c 6 C.
Suppose that c £ C with c P  c. Because preferences are continuous and 
monotone in all goods except 0, and because (A.l)  is satisfied, there exists j =  
(z0,z G) £ 3fG+1 with =  oo and zG »  cG such that c P  z. Also, for all large 
enough v one must have zo =  c„ and zG >  c"G, implying that z 6 C v with 
z P " c".
Now let w =  (ui0,w G) 6 JfG+1 satisfy w0 =  c0 and wG >  cG. Then, since 
c £ C while C ” —» C  as v —» oo, free disposal implies that w £ Cv for all large 
enough v. Also monotone preferences imply that w P  c. Because we have already 




























































































lie in the graph of the relation R, and so there must be an infinite sequence of 
values of v for which (z,w ) does not lie in the graph of /?" either. But then, since 
w, z £ C" for all large enough u, there must be infinitely many values of v for 
which w P v z and so tv P 1' z P 1' c". By transitivity of P v. it follows that w P" c" 
for all these values of v. Since c" £ ( ( C ". R ",p " , m ") for v =  1,2, . . . ,  this implies 
that p" w >  p" c" =  m" for infinitely many v. But p" —> p and vn" —* m as 
v —> oo, so pw  > fh .  Since this is true whenever u>o =  Co and wa  S> cG, it follows 
that p c >  m.
So we have proved that c P  c implies p c > in. Because preferences are 
monotone and so locally non-satiated, it follows that c R c implies p c >  rh. 
This confirms that c £ £ (C ,R ,p,m ), as required for the compensated demand 
correspondence ((C\ /? ,p. rn) to have a closed graph.
C: Continuity of compensated net trade demand.
Finally, let (C ", Y ", R IJ.p", x") ()' =  1,2, . . . )  be any infinite sequence of points 
in the graph of£(C , Y, R ,p) which converges to (C .Y .R , p. x) as v —> oc. By defini­
tion of £, there exist sequences c" £ C u. Ru , tt ( pv) J and y" £ ?/(Y u. jt" ) C 
Y "  such that x v =  c" — y" (u =  1 , 2, . . . ) .
Now, as v —* oo, so Y v —» Y  and C" —» C in the topology of closed conver­
gence. But Y  is bounded above, while C is bounded below, so the two sequences 
y" £ Y v and cv £ C  must be bounded above and below, respectively. Yet then 
y v is also bounded below, because y" =  c“ — x" and x" —> i  as v —» oo. Therefore 
y v is actually bounded both alrove and below, and so must have a convergent 
subsequence with a limit point y £ Y. But then, since x" —> x as v —> oo, the 
corresponding subsequence of c" must also have a limit point c £ C given by 
c :=  x +  y.
Because of the continuity properties of 7r(V,p), t/(Y,p), and ((C , R ,p ,m ) 
which have just been proved in parts A and B alrove, it now follows that y £ 
t)(Y,p), that ir(Y,p) =  py, and also that c £ C(C, 77,p, tr(T',p)). Therefore
x =  c -  y £ C(C, 77,p, tt(Y ,p )) -  i)(Y,p) =  f(C\Y. R.p),




























































































3.5. Existence of Compensated Equilibrium
THEOREM. Under Assumptions (A .1-A.3) as stated in Sections 3.1-3.3 above, 
there exists a compensated equilibrium.
PROOF: From the continuity result of Section 3.4, it follows that the correspon­
dence £ : A  defined by £(a) :=  £(E(a),p) has a measurable graph because,
by hypothesis, E  is a measurable function, and because £ has a closed and so 
a measurable graph (Hildenbrand, 1974, p. 59, Prop. 1(b)). Moreover, for each 
positive integer k > G the budget correspondence B a(p) is integrably bounded on 
the restricted domain A x A*, where
A ,  : = { p e  A \ V g e G : p g > l / k } .  (23)
So the mean compensated demand correspondence /3k ■ A * —»$RG+1 defined by 
Pk{p) '■= Sa €a(p) d® has all the relevant properties of Khan and Yamazaki’s (1981, 
pp. 223) mapping Fk(p) — in particular, it has non-empty, compact and convex 
values, a closed graph, and the range (3k(A*) is also compact. As a result, for each 
k =  G, G +  1, G -1- 2 , . . .  the correspondence tpk ■ A  * x /?*(A*) —►* A* x (3k( A*) 
which is defined throughout its domain by
4>k(p, z) :=  arg max { p z \ p e  A* } x jjk(p)
V
has a fixed point (pk,z\t) G ipk(Pk, Zk)- So there exist infinite sequences of price 
vectors pk G A *, quantity vectors Zk G 9£G+1 and integrably bounded measurable 
mappings f k : A - >  KG+1 (k =  G, G +  1 , G +  2 , . . . )  such that: (i) f k(a) e  f G(pt) 
a.e. in A\ (ii) zk =  f  f k; (iii) p z k < 0 for all p £ A k. But then zk S f  x . Also, 
because (1/G) (1,1 , . . . ,  1) £ A/,., (iii) above implies that Zka — 0 f°r
k > G. So the sequence of fixed points (l>k,z k) always lies in the compact set 
A  X Z, where
Z := { z 6 5f?G+1 | 2 = J x and Zj < 0 }.
Hence there must exist some subsequence of (pk, zk) (k =  G, G + l ,  G + 2 , . . . )  which 
converges to a limit point (p*,z*) £ A  x Z. Moreover, Fatou’s Lemma in many 
dimensions (see, for instance, Hildenbrand, 1974, p. 69) can now be applied to show 




























































































together with some p £ A and some measurable function /  : A  —> 3f6+1 such that: 
(iv) /  /  is z*; and also, as to - »  oo, so: (v) p*(m) -* p*; (vi) /  / t.(m) =  z/t(m) -* z*; 
(vii) /t(m)(a) -*  / ( « )  a.e. in A.
Now, for any positive integers m and r such that k(rn) >  r, (iii) implies that 
P f  fk(m) 5: 0 for all p £ A r C Aj.(m). Because of (vi), taking the limit as m —> oo 
gives p z * <  0 for all p G A r. Since this is true for any positive integer r, one has 
pz* <  0 for all p £ A 0 =  U“  [A r. But p0 =  0 and so pG z*G <  0 for all pG >  0 
satisfying Pa =  1- Hence z*G = 0. Moreover, since nobody can over have a
positive demand for good 0 and so z j <  0, it follows that z* = 0 — and so, by (iv) 
above, that f  f  = 0.
Finally, since (i) implies that / t (m)(a) G (a(Pt(m)) a.e. >n A, and since (v) and 
(vii) above are both true, the closed graph property of the compensated demand 
correspondence implies that / (a )  £ f G(p*) a.e. in .4. So ( / , p*) together form a 
compensated equilibrium.
3.6. Core A llocations A re Com pensated Equilibria
THEOREM. Under Assumptions (A .l) and (A.2) as stated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
any core allocation is a compensated equilibrium.
PROOF: Let f  : A —> S G+1 be any (measurable) allocation in the core. Now define 
the four correspondences
0 N(a ) := {6 £ S R G | ( - l ,6 )G A 'a and ( -1  , b ) y a f ( a ) }
<t>S(a ) :=  { 6 G Xa | (0, b) G X a and (0, b) y a f (a ) }
0(a) :=  0 w(a) U 0s (a)
=  { x G 6 Rg | 3.To G { - 1 , 0 }  : ( r 0,.rG) G X a and (.r0, x G) y a f ( a ) } 
0 ( a ) :=  0 (a )U {0}
(24)
on the common domain A , and for the common range space 3tG. Arguing as in 
Hildenbrand (1974, pp. 133-5), it follows that the two correspondences <j>N(a) and 
0 s (a) both have measurable graphs in .4 x 3?G. So therefore does the correspon­
dence 0 , since its graph is the union of the measurable graphs of the correspon­
dences <t>N(a) and 0 s (a) with the measurable set A x {0}. Also f  ip da is a convex 




























































































Suppose it were true that z G f  ip da for some 2 G 5fG such that 2 < 0 .  Then 
there must be a measurable set K  C A for which z G f h- <j>(a) da, and so K  must be 
a blocking coalition. Hence, if /  is indeed in the core, the two convex sets f  ip da 
and { 2 6  5RG | 2 0 } must be non-empty and disjoint. So they can be separated
by a hyperplane pG z =  0 through the origin with pa > 0 and Ps ~  1-
Thus, pa z >  0 whenever 2.6 f  ip da. Let p :=  (0,pG) 6 A  be the corresponding 
G +  1-dimensional price vector in which life is given a price of zero. Then, a.e. in 
A, it must be true that X >-a f(a )  implies p x  >  0. In particular, a.e. in A, px  > 0 
whenever x a / G(a). Then, because / G(a) is the limit of an infinite sequence 
(x I'G) of points satisfying x va / G(a), it follows that, a.e. in A, p f(a )  >  0. Yet 
p >  0 and so, since feasibility implies that J f  =  0, it must be true that J p f  < 0 . 
Now the last two sentences will contradict each other unless J p f  =  0 and in fact 
p f(a )  =  0 a.e. in A. Therefore (f , p ) is a compensated equilibrium.
3.7. Pareto Efficient Allocations Are Compensated Competitive
THEOREM. Under Assumptions (A .l) and (A .2) as stated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
any Pareto efficient allocation f  : A —> 3fG+1 is a compensated equilibrium at 
some price vector p £ A when each consumer a £ A  receives the net lump-sum 
transfer p f  (a).
PROOF: The separation argument used in Section 3.6 above can be easily be 
adapted as follows. Indeed, J <j>da and { c G 3iG | 2 C  0 )  are non-empty con­
vex sets which must be disjoint if /  is a Pareto efficient allocation. Now we can 
follow the argument of Hildenbrand (1974, p. 232) in order to show the existence 
of a normalized price vector pa > 0 such that pa J f G =  0 and also, a.e. in A, 
x a G <p(a) implies pa x G >  pG f G(a). But then, if we let p :=  (0,pG) G A, it 




























































































3 .8 . T h e  C h e a p e r  P o in t  L e m m a
LEMMA. Suppose that (C, Y ,R) satisfy (A .l) and (A.2), while (-Y, te) are derived 
as in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Suppose that x £ X  is such that, for all x 6 X , one 
has p x  >  p x  whenever x fcx. Then:
(a) If x £ X s and there also exists x* £ X s for which p x * < px , then for all 
x £ X  one has p x  > p x  whenever x y  x.
(b) If x £ X N and there also exists x * £ X N for which p x  < px*, then for all 
x £ X  v one has px  > px whenever x  y  x.
PROOF: Under the hypothesis of the Lemma, there must exist c £ C and y £ Y 
such that x =  c — y while c R c =*■ px  > pc and y £ Y  = >  p y  < py. Now:
Case (a).
Here c £ C s and there must also exist c* £ C s  and y ’  £ Y  for which x* =  
c* — y* and px* < px. Then py* < py  and so pc* =  px*  +  py* < p x  +  p y  =  pc. 
By a standard argument for the convex consumption set C s and the continuous 
preference ordering R, it now follows that, whenever c £ C s  with c P  c, then 
p c  > pc. Hence, if x £ X  with x y  x, so that there exist c £ C s and y £ Y  for 
which x =  c — y and c P c., then py  >  py  and so
p x  +  py — pc > pc  =  px  +  p y  > p i  +  py.
Therefore p x  > px, as required for the Lemma to be true.
Case (b).
Here c 6 C N. As in the proof of case (a) above, there must exist c* £ C N 
such that pc* <  pc. Once again, by a standard argument applied to the convex 
consumption set C'N and the continuous preference ordering R, it follows that, 
whenever c £ C N with c P c, then pc > pc. Hence, if x £ X N with x y  x, so that 





























































































3.9. Conditions for Compensated Equilibria to Be Walrasian
First we assume that:
(A .4). Ois in the interior of the projection o f the set f A X a a(da) onto the subspace
H t G .
Effectively (A.4) requires that some trade is possible in every direction of the 
physical commodity space 5RG, thereby ruling out the “exceptional case” presented 
by Arrow (1951).
The irreducibility assumption due to McKenzie (1959, 1961, 1981, 1987) has 
been adapted by Hildenbrand (1972; 1974, p. 143, Problem 8) for a continuum 
economy. Next we generalize Hildenbrand’s version of this assumption somewhat, 
along the lines discussed in Hammond (1991). There too rather more motivation 
is provided, along with a further weakening. Here we assume that:
(A .5). For every allocation f  and every measurable partition of A into two sets 
A\ and Ai o f positive measure, there exist measurable functions t : A —> 5RG+1, 
y : A 2 -> ft°+ \  and a set A * C .4] whose measure is positive, such that: (i) 
f A tda  +  f ^ y d a S  0; (ii) y(a) £ X a a.e. in A 2; (Hi) t(a )izaf (a ) a.e. in A; (iv) 
t(a) a / (a )  a.e. in A*.
Thus (A .5) requires that there exist balanced net trades t(a) (a £ A) and 
y(a) (a £ A i ) which, if there were duplicates of the agents o t A j  who could be 
required to provide the net supply vectors —y(a), would make possible a Pareto 
improvement with every agent a 6 .4 having the new net trade vector t(a), and 
with a non-null set A * of agents a £ Ai becoming strictly better off.
For the usual reasons, (A.4) and (A.5), when combined with the earlier as­
sumptions (A .l) and (A.2), will together ensure that, at any compensated equilib­
rium price vector p £ A , almost all agents a can afford a net trade vector x £ X a 
with positive value p x >  0. However, there may still be a non-negligible set of 




























































































prevent existence of Walrasian equilibrium. For every price vector p £ A  and every 
income level m, it is agents in the set
A(p,m ) :=  {a  £ A \ 3x £ : px  =  m and Vr' £ A 'f : p x ’ > m }. (25)
who are on the margin of survival when faced with the budget constraint p x  =  
m. If a £ A(p,m ) then in fact m can be regarded as a’s minimum subsistence 
expenditure, because it must be equal to minJ: { p x j x £ }.
An assumption which is more than sufficient for our purposes is:
(A .6*). For every p > 0 and m £ 3J one has a(A (p ,m )) =  0.
This is a “dispersed needs” version of Yamazaki’s (10S1) “dispersed endow­
ments” assumption. It states that there can be no atoms in the distribution of 
subsistence expenditures at any given price vector p > 0. An obvious implication 
of (A .6*) is the much weaker:
(A .6). For every p >  0, one has cv( A(p, 0)) = 0.
The three extra assumptions (A.4-A.6) will combine with (A .l) and (A .2) to 
ensure that any compensated equilibrium is Walrasian. Indeed, given the compen­
sated equilibrium (f,p ), define the two sets of agents
A' :=  { a € .4 | 3x £ X a : px  < 0 }; A :=  .4(p, 0). (26)
The set A consists of those agents whose budget constraint p x  <  0 leaves them 
on the margin of survival. By a standard argument, (A .4) implies that A' has 
positive measure, otherwise it would be true that p f x a da > 0 whenever x a £ X a 
for a.e. a £ A. Now we make use of the following two Lemmas:
LEMMA A. Let ( f ,p ) be a compensated equilibrium in an economy satisfying 
assumptions (A .l), (A .2), and (A.4-A.6), and let a be any agent in the set A' \ A. 
Then x y a f(a ) implies p x  > 0, and so f(a.) £ £a(p)-




























































































C ase S. / ( a )  £  X a®.
Then x =  /  (a) is a member of X® satisfying p x  =  0. Since a $  A, there must 
exist x * 6 X® such that p x * <  0. But x y a f (a )  is only possible in this case if
In this case x £ X® implies that x y a f { a) and so p x  > 0. Since a, 0 A. there
because we have already seen that x* £ A'® would imply that p x * >  0.
Now note that because preferences are monotone and ( f ,p )  is a compensated 
equilibrium, p f(a )  =  0 a.e. in A. Let x £ X a be any feasible net trade vector 
satisfying x > a f(a ). In either case S or N, the Cheaper Point Lemma of Section 
3.8 can then be applied to show that px > p f(a )  =  0.
Lemma B. Under assumptions (A .l), (A .2), and (A.4-A.6), any compensated 
equilibrium (f ,p ) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
PROOF: Suppose that ( / ,p )  is a compensated equilibrium for which (A .l), (A.2), 
(A.4) and (A .5) are all satisfied. Let .42 :=  A \ A' and Ai :=  A'. By (A.4) it must 
be true that o (A i)  > 0.
Suppose also that a (A 2) >  0. Then (A .5) implies that there exist mappings 
t : A —> 5f?G+1, y : A 2 —> 5RG+1, and a set .4* C -4] such that: (i) a(A*) > 0; (ii) 
j A tda +  f A  ̂y da = 0; (iii) y(a) £ X’ „ a.e. in A2 =  .4 \ .4'; (iv) t(a) fc „ /(a ) a.e. in 
A; and (v) t(a) y a f(a )  a.e. in .4*. Then, since p > 0 it follows from (ii), (iii), and 
the definitions of A2, A' that
But (iv) implies that pt(a) > p f(a )  =  0 a.e. in .4, and so the above inequality 
can only be true if pt(a ) =  0 a.e. in A. Now, together with the above Lemma, (v) 
clearly implies that i * C i  \ (A ' \ A). Yet A* C Aj =  A ' and so
Since cv(A*) > 0 by (i) above, this implies that a(A ) > 0. This contradicts (A .6), 
however.
x £ X®
Case N. / (a )  £ X f .
can be no x £ X® for which px  =  0. Hence x £ A'® implies p x  >  0. So we need 
only consider the case when x £ . Yet by hypothesis a £ A' and so there exists
x* £ X a such that px* < 0 . Of course, this cheaper point must satisfy x* £ X ^




























































































So all three assumptions (A.4-A.G) can only be satisfied if a (A 2) =  a(A\A') = 
0. Because af A) =  0, this clearly implies that the set A \ (A’ \ A) must also have 
zero measure. Hence (f ,p ) must in fact be a Walrasian equilibrium, because of 
Lemma A above. |
Combined with our earlier results, we now have:
EXISTENCE T heorem . Under assumptions (A.1-A.6), there exists a Walrasian 
equilibrium.
Core Equivalence T heorem. Under assumptions (A.1-A.6), the core coin­
cides with the set o f Walrasian equilibrium allocations.
3.10. Second Efficiency Theorem
Here we find when a particular Pareto efficient allocation /  is competitive, in 
the sense that there exists a price vector p >  0 such that p J f  da =  0 and, a.e. in 
A, x / ( « )  implies px  > p f(a ). Then /  could be decentralized by facing each 
agent a 6 A with the budget constraint p x  < p f ( a ), each agent receiving a net 
lump-sum transfer equal to p f(a ).
We have already shown in Section 3.7 that a Pareto efficient allocation is 
compensated competitive at some price vector p > 0 with p0 =  0. To show that it 
is competitive at p, it suffices to make modified versions of the assumptions (A .4) 
and (A .5) in Section 3.8 above.
First, for the fixed allocation / ,  define the sets of survivors and of non­
survivors as
As :=  { a 6 .4 | f (a )  6 A’ f  } and A N :=  { a e  .4 | / (a )  6 X ?  } (27)
respectively. Then the modified version of (A.4) which we shall use here is:
(A .4 '). 0 belongs to the interior of the projection o f the set f {S A 'f d a + fAN X a da 
onto the subspace 5FJG.




























































































(A .5'). For the particular allocation f  and for every measurable partition of A 
into two sets Ai and A 2 of positive measure, there exists a measurable function 
t : A —> 3JG+1 with f0(a) =  0 (all a 6 A), and a measurable set A* C Ai o f positive 
measure, such that: (i) f A tda% 0; (ii) t(a) £ A'a a.e. in A 2; (Hi) t(a) £ X ^  a.e. 
in A2 fl A s ; (iv) t(a)£iaf (a)  a.e. in A t ; (v) t(a) y a f (a)  a.e. in A*.
The above condition requires that there be no “oligarchy” — i.e., no proper 
subset A] of agents who are so well off with the allocation /  that collectively they 
could not possibly ever be made any better off even if they were given access to all 
the resources which the other agents in the complementary set A2 could supply. 
Except for part (iii), it has been taken directly from Hammond (1991). Here part
(iii) has been added because, as will be seen, it guarantees that almost no agent 
is on the boundary of A * . For the survivors in A2, it restricts the complementary 
coalition to use only those resources that can be taken without driving them below 
subsistence.
T he Second Efficiency T heorem. Let f  be any Pareto efficient allocation 
satisfying (A .4') and (A .5') in an economy E satisfying (A .l), (A.2) and (A .3). 
Then there exists a price vector p > 0 at which f  is competitive — i.e., a.e. in A, 
x >-a f ( a) implies px  > p f(a).
PROOF: Define
A s :=  { a £ A s  | 3x £ A 'f : p x  < p f(a )  };
A N :=  { a £ A w | 3* 6 X a : p x <  p f(a )  }; (28)
A' := A s U A N.
Then by the standard argument which we recapitulated previously, o (A ') > 0 
because of (A.4') and because f  p f  =  0. Also, the Cheaper Point Lemma of 
Section 3.8 shows that, a.e. in A ', x >-a / (a )  implies p x  > p f(a ). So it suffices to 
show that a(A  \ A ') =  0. To this end, note how o (A  \ A') >  0 would allow (A .5') 
to be applied with A] =  A' and A 2 =  A  \ A'. A standard argument would then
establish a contradiction, so in fact o (A  \ A ') =  0. Hence the allocation /  must




























































































3.11. A Sufficient Condition for Universal Survival
Finally, we find a sufficient condition like Moore’s (1975) and McKenzie’s 
(1981, 1987) for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in which all agents sur­
vive. We modify the old conditions (A.4) and (A .5) so that they become:
(A .4s ). 0 belongs to the interior of the projection of the set J X s da onto the 
subspace
(A .5s ). For every allocation f  and every measurable partition of A into two sets 
A i and A 2 o f positive measure, there exist measurable functions t : A —> 9fG+1 
with to(a) =  0 (all a £ A), y : .42 —> 3fG+1 with y0(a) =  0 (all n £ A 2), and a 
measurable set A* C A\ of positive measure, such tha t: (i) j  { t da +  y da = 0; 
(ii) y(a) £ X s  a.e. in A2; (Hi) t(a)£.af(a ) a.e. in .4; (iv) t(a) X , / ( « )  a.e. in A*.
Now:
Survival T heorem. Let E be an economy satisfying (A.1-A.3), (A.4s ), and 
(A.5s ). Then there exists a Walrasian equilibrium and, in any Walrasian equilib­
rium, almost all agents survive. The same is true of the core allocations, and the 
core coincides with the set o f Walrasian equilibrium allocations.
PROOF: Suppose that ( f ,p )  is a compensated Walrasian equilibrium. Let
A s  :=  { a e  A | 3x e  X s : px  <  0 }. (29)
Then (A.4S) evidently implies that o (A s ) > 0 .  By a standard argument, one 
has / (a )  £ £a(p) a.e. in A s . The “ survival” irreducibility assumption (A.5s ) then 
establishes that a(A  \ A s ) =  0, by another standard argument. So ( / .  p) must be 





























































































4. Conclusions and Reservations
Section 2 considered an example showing how to extend the usual Walrasian 
model of a competitive market economy in order to deal seriously with the issue 
of survival, which standard general equilibrium theory is quite unable to discuss. 
That example was also able to offer considerable support for the Malthusian in­
sight that more equality in the distribution of land would help more people to 
survive. As Woodham-Smith (1962, p. 20) has written of the Irish Famine:
All this wretchedness and misery could, almost without exception, be 
traced to a single source — the system under which land had come to 
be owned and occupied in Ireland, a system produced by centuries of 
successive conquests, rebellions, confiscations and punitive legislation.
Also, in that example a system of food subsidies financed by a tax on land, on 
labour, or on both, was not even able to reduce starvation, much less guarantee 
complete survival. In another model not presented here, where labour supply is 
elastic, we were able to show essentially the same results, and also conclude that 
redistribution permits more people to survive than a welfare program financed by 
a (distortionary) income tax.
Section 3 then presented a general model of a continuum economy with in­
dividual production. With relatively minor modifications, the standard results 
of general equilibrium theory were shown to apply even when one takes into ac­
count the possibility that not all agents survive. The modifications were needed to 
deal with the inherent non-convexities in each individual’s consumption set as one 
passes between survival and death. Existence of Walrasian equilibrium was proved 
without any survival assumption when there is a continuum of individuals whose 
needs for subsistence net trade vectors are dispersed. A Walrasian equilibrium, 
however, may require that some individuals not survive. Even when it does, as 
happens in some of the cases presented in Section 2, such an equilibrium is still 
Pareto efficient; to allow more individuals to survive, for instance, would require 
sacrifices from some of those who are fortunate enough to be able to survive any­




























































































survival, is a Walrasian equilibrium for a suitable system of lump-sum transfers. 
Thus all the classical existence and efficiency theorems apply. Core equivalence 
holds as well. Non-survivors lack the resources they need to block a Walrasian 
equilibrium and ensure their own survival. Finally, the paper presented sufficient 
conditions analogous to McKenzie’s (1981) for survival of the whole population.
So the tragedy of starvation can arise in economies characterized by perfect 
competition. Then starvation is not a result of market failure. Like the involuntary 
unemployment that arises in Dasgupta and Ray (1986-7), it is not the result 
either of unnecessary institutional rigidities in the labour market. Instead it is an 
entirely natural phenomenon of a neoclassical economy with surplus labour. Only 
after excess labour has been removed through starvation can general equilibrium 
arise. As Joan Robinson (1946, pp. 189) wrote, "The hidden hand will always do 
its work, but it may work by strangulation.” Or as Benjamin Jowett (formerly 
master of Balliol College, Oxford) was once moved to remark (according to The 
White Plague, by Frank Herbert), “I have always felt a certain horror of political 
economists, since I heard one of them say that he feared the famine of 1848 would 
not kill more than a million people, and that would be scarcely enough to do 
much good.” Even then, (compensated) Walrasian equilibrium with starvation is 
Pareto efficient. To allow more individuals to survive requires sacrifices from some 
of those who survive anyway.
The fact that both Walrasian equilibrium and Pareto efficiency do not require 
all to survive should really be no great surprise. If the analysis seems heartless 
in the face of human misery, that is a true reflection of the price mechanism in a 
laissez fuire economy which general equilibrium theory is intended to model. It also 
illustrates the ethical inadequacy of the Pareto criterion unless it is supplemented 
by further value judgments concerning the distribution of income or at least the 
alleviation of extreme poverty. For starvation may well be Pareto efficient, just as 
maximizing the preference ordering of a dictator is. Nor do the starving have the 




























































































— they can only hope for non-market remedies, some of which were discussed in 
Section 2.
We have heard the view expressed that, if people really care enough about 
such poverty, then private charities will arise to assist the destitute. Yet such 
charity is effectively a public good, subject to the well known free-rider problem, 
as has been discussed by Mirrlees (1973), Arrow (1981) and many others. It can 
also be argued that char ity exploits unduly those who have a charitable disposition. 
While the coercion of a tax-financed welfare program may not necessarily be the 
best resolution of this particular free-rider problem, more suitable alternatives 
have yet to be found, and the starving can hardly afford to wait for one.
This is clearly a problem for which a. political economist should be able to 
give useful advice. Blind adherence to laissez faire economic policy and neglect of 
distributional issues lead to starvation. As Sen (19S4, p. 31) wrote: “ In the past, 
economic policies regarding food have often been ineffective, or worse, precisely 
because of concentrating on misleading variables, e.g. total food output, physical 
transport capacity. Unhappily, these mistakes are still made . . . ” Similar ideas 
are also discussed, of course, in Dreze and Sen (19S9). In our model, the right 
kind of government intervention, if it is possible, modifies Walrasian equilibrium 
to ensure complete survival. If market forces cannot be brought under control, 
complete survival may be impossible (cf. Hammond, 1987). We hope to have 
helped in making more economists understand how there are almost no limits to 
the cruel injustices which are possible in even a “perfect” market economy, and 
to encourage them to allow more “imperfections” or “distortions” into a market 
system if those are what even limited distributive justice requires.
The major limitation of our work is that we have considered only static Wal­
rasian equilibria. Yet issues of survival are essentially dynamic. Death from mal­
nutrition is gradual, and anyway is often indirect because it increases susceptibility 
to diseases which then appear to strike at random. The margin of survival, in the 




























































































dynamic, as crops fail, food prices rise rapidly, and populations of whole villages 
leave their land in a desperate search for something to eat. A realistic dynamic 
model would be much more complicated, but it is our belief that it would not 
greatly modify or add to what the simple static model has to teach us concerning 
the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibrium without survival.
One other important question, however, certainly cannot be discussed in our 
static model. This is the Malthusian issue: if more of the population is enabled 
to survive today, does this only serve to render intolerable the increased pressure 
of population tomorrow? We have nothing here to add to this old and much 
discussed question, except for the common and hopeful observation that going 
beyond survival and into moderate prosperity appears to limit fertility. We believe, 
then, that Malthusian arguments do not provide us with any justifiable excuse for 
not trying to help more of the poorest in the world to survive, going beyond laissez 
faire to do so wherever necessary.
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